2003-03-14 The Blank Slate- portions of the mind Extract The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker, ch13 'Out of Our Depths' (p220) What make our reasoning faculties different from the departments in a university is that they are not just broad areas of knowledge, analyzed with whatever tools work best. Each faculty is based on a core intuition that was suitable for analyzing the world in which we evolved. Though cognitive scientists have not agreed on a Gray's Anatomy of the mind, here is a tentative but defensible list of cognitive faculties and the core intuitions on which they are based: * An intuitive physics, which we use to keep track of how objects fall, bounce, and bend. Its core intuition is the concept of the object, which occupies one place, exists for a continuous span of time, and follows laws of motion and force. They are not Newton's laws but something closer to the medieval conceptions of impetus, an "oomph" that keep an object in motion and gradually dissipates.[2] * An intuitive version of biology or natural history, which we use to understand the living world. Its core intuition is that living things house a hidden essence that gives them their form and powers and drives their growth and bodily functions.[3] * An intuitive engineering, which we use to make and understand tools and other artifacts. Its core intuition is that a tool is an object with a purpose--an object designed by a person to achieve a goal.[4] * An intuitive psychology, which we use to understand other people. Its core intuition is that other people are not objects or machines but are animated by the invisible entity we call the mind of the soul. Minds contain beliefs and desires and are the immediate cause of behavior. * A spatial sense, which we use to navigate the world and keep track of where things are. It is based on a dead reckoner, which updates coordinates of the body's location as it moves and turns, and a network of mental maps. Each map is organized by a different reference frame: the eyes, the head, the body, or salient objects and places in the world.[5] * A number sense, which we use to think about quantities and amounts. It is based on an ability to register exact quantities for small numbers of objects (one, two, and three) and to make rough relative estimates for larger numbers.[6] * A sense of probability, which we use to reason about the likelihood of uncertain events. It is based on the ability to track the relative frequencies of events, that is, the proportion of events to some kind that turn out one way or the other.[7] * An intuitive economics, which we use to exchange goods and favors. It is based on the concept of reciprocal exchange, in which one party confers a benefit on another and is entitled to an equivalent benefit in return. * A mental database and logic, which we use to represent ideas and to infer new ideas from old ones. It is based on assertations about what's what, what's where, or who did what to whom, when, where, and why. The assertations are linking in a mind-wide web and can be recombined with logical and causal operators such as AND, OR, NOT, ALL, SOME, NECESSARY, POSSIBLE, and CAUSE.[8] * Language, which we use to share the ideas from our mental logic. It is based on a mental dictionary of memorized words and a mental grammar of combinatorial rules. The rules organize vowals and consonants into words, words into bigger words and phrases, and phrases into sentences, in such a way that the meaning of the combination can be computed from the meanings of the parts and the way they are arranged.[9] The mind also has components for which it is hard to tell where cognition leaves off and emotion begins. These include a system for assessing danger, coupled with the emotion called fear, a system for assessing contamination, coupled with the emotion called disgust, and a moral sense, which is complex enough to deserve a chapter of its own. [2] Spelke, 1995. [3] Atran, 1995; Atran, 1998; Gelman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994; Kiel, 1995. [4] Bloom, 1996; Kiel, 1989. [5] Gallistel, 1990; Kosslyn, 1994; [6] Butterworth, 1999; Dehaene, 1997; Devlin, 2000; Geary, 1994; Lakoff & Nunez, 2000. [7] Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1997; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; [8] Braine, 1994; Jackendoff, 1990; Macnamara & Reyes, 1994; Pinker, 1989. [9] Pinker, 1994; Pinker, 1999. (Footnotes refer to papers in the 'References' section.)